

## SPORT VENUES

# Protecting the Public's Interest: Options for Structuring Public Authorities for Sport Venues

Mark S. Rosentraub, Michael B. Cantor, Sierra R. Bain

## Abstract

*This study illustrates the benefits of public–private partnerships in creating public corporations to build sport venues. In addition to potential returns, public officials' understanding of the potential structures of these authorities is equally important. Additionally, as the scope of public–private partnerships broadens, it is essential for administrators of secondary and higher level education to recognize the benefits of and understand the structure of these partnerships. This study presents the structures of four authorities and the details of the sport-related partnerships they entered. The authorities include the Gateway Economic Development Corporation of Greater Cleveland, Indianapolis Capital Improvement Board, Frisco Economic Development Corporation, and Detroit Downtown Development Authority. In each instance, individual outcomes were analyzed. This paper illustrates the range of responsibilities that could be assigned to authorities and the potential for benefits to be generated for teams, cities, universities, and school districts. The results from each partnership reflect the structure of the public authority. To protect the public's interest, the legislation creating a new public corporation must clearly outline its objectives, structure, and responsibilities. But when cities, universities, and school districts utilize authorities for sport-related development projects, the opportunities for achieving public policy goals are more expansive than many realize.*

---

Mark S. Rosentraub is a professor of Sport Management, University of Michigan. Michael B. Cantor is a project manager, Sterling Project Development. Sierra R. Bain is a senior research assistant, Center for Sport and Policy, University of Michigan. Please send author correspondence to [msrosen@umich.edu](mailto:msrosen@umich.edu)

Public–private partnerships created for the purpose of building venues for professional sport teams have been a staple of public administration for decades (Turner, 2002). At the cornerstone of these partnerships lie independent public authorities, development corporations, or special districts created for the purpose of facilitating the financing and management of professional sport facilities. In certain cases, authorities have the responsibility to leverage the assets to enhance real-estate development and produce revenue. These independent authorities are often necessary, as there are limits on the amount of debt local governments can assume; their purpose is to reduce the stress on governmental units’ borrowing capacities. In the past 2 decades, the range of participants in these partnerships has broadened to include school districts and universities (Patrinos & Barrera-Osorio, 2009). As the use of public–private partnerships persists and expands, it is important for community leaders to understand the implications of authorities’ structures and their potential benefits.

An authority’s structure determines the actions it may undertake. To achieve the goals set by public officials, authorities must consider advantages and limitations of different organizational designs. Studies of public authorities created for the purpose of leading transportation projects and other large-scale economic development initiatives provide some guidance, but little research has described the various administrative structures for public corporations designed to manage sport venues. To address this shortcoming, this study presents an assessment of several sport-specific authorities and their outcomes. This analysis can advise local governments about how to structure future authorities based on their community’s needs.

## **Why Are Authorities Needed?**

Numerous academics have documented the positive relationship between sport venues and real-estate values (Feng & Humphreys, 2012a, 2012b, 2018; Tu, 2005). Many cities hope to harness these benefits by investing in sport venues. It could be argued these gains would ensue even if the venue was privately financed. However, without a public investment, a team owner might select a venue location to maximize private returns without regard for the effect on a city. Polycentric metropolitan regions, with concentrations of higher income households in economically segregated suburban

municipalities, create tax competition between older central cities and their suburbs (Jargowsky, 1996). With states straining to meet pension responsibilities, less money is available for revenue-sharing programs, so central cities must aggressively compete to sustain own-source revenues and leverage unique amenities (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). Sport venues can attract young professionals and higher income households to an area, can capture regional economic activity, and have been statistically linked to elevated real-estate values (Cantor & Rosentraub, 2012). The prospect of public-sector benefits, including potential downtown revitalization and/or anticipated tax revenues, helps explain public officials' willingness to invest in venues.

However, every state has debt limits for its local governments. For example, in Wisconsin, a local government's debt cannot exceed 5% of the equalized value of property in its jurisdiction. By assuming the debt for a sport venue, a city government would reduce its ability to borrow money for other infrastructure needs. This necessitates the creation of a public corporation, special district, or authority. Independent authorities assume debt while ensuring the interest paid is still exempt from federal income tax.<sup>1</sup> Some claim local governments use a public authority to obfuscate debt levels while reducing the taxes paid by investors. However, there is value in a venue's ability to achieve public policy goals and generate tangible economic benefits for host cities (Chapin, 2002; Erie, Kogan, & MacKenzie, 2011; Rosentraub, 2014).

While the use of authorities for building and managing sport venues is a relatively recent practice, local governments can learn from an extensive history of public authorities assisting in economic development. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and Massport of Boston, each facilitated economic development by constructing and maintaining bridges, tunnels, mass transit systems, and airports. A recent assessment of the Port Authority underscored the need for ensuring the public's interest is protected (Moss & O'Neill, 2014). The authority expanded its original mission in the 1960s, and

---

<sup>1</sup>For bonds to be tax exempt, a public sector entity must participate in the financing of the venue, and the team's lease cannot contribute more than 10% of the debt service needed for repaying the bonds. In June 2017, a U.S. senate bill was introduced that would eliminate the tax exemption for sport venues used by a professional team; the bill was not passed. Further, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 sustained the use of tax-exempt bonds for sport venues.

again in the 1970s, to take on activities falling outside this authority's original scope of work.

Strahinich noted in his 1989 article analyzing Massport's work in building and operating Boston's Logan Airport, authorities can do work the public sector is ill-suited to perform. Authorities have a permanency to facilitate long-term relationships with the private sector. In a similar vein, the relationships between cities and sport teams often extend for over 100 years, making authorities a well-suited linkage between the public sector and private entities. In summarizing authorities, Strahinich cautioned, some of these organizations' activities conflict with public policies. However, he suggested, public authorities in the hands of careful stewards of economic activity and the public's goals can accomplish a great deal.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) also suggested authorities should be designed to accomplish the goals sought by a government. The objectives of the sanctioning governments, as well as the structure and responsibilities of the new organization, must be framed in the enabling legislation (Brooks & Pallis, 2008). When allocating the tools an authority can utilize, the government must consider two essential dimensions. The first factor is whether the authority will have access to a reliable revenue stream. An authority with a dedicated revenue stream will have a level of independence; alternatively, by controlling the "purse strings," a local government could ensure an authority's dependence on the body creating it. The second factor is the authority's scope of responsibilities. The scope could range from building a single venue, to the development of a sports district, to the ability to participate in adjacent real-estate development projects. A framework outlining an authority's responsibilities and available resources could protect and advance the public's interest.

For this study to illustrate the implications of different frameworks, four authorities with varying designs were studied: the Gateway Economic Development Corporation of Greater Cleveland (GEDC), the Indianapolis Capital Improvement Board (CIB), the Frisco Economic Development Corporation (FEDC), and the Detroit Downtown Development Authority (DDA). This analysis provides insight for governments considering the use of authorities for sport-related projects.

## Lessons From Different Organizations: Sports and Development

### Gateway Economic Development Corporation of Greater Cleveland

In May 1990, Cleveland and Cuyahoga County created the GEDC to oversee the building, operation, and maintenance of a ballpark for the Cleveland Indians and an arena for the Cleveland Cavaliers. Despite the broad geographic scale of its name, the GEDC was not given the authority to assist in redeveloping downtown Cleveland. This public corporation's sphere of influence was limited to building the two venues, lease negotiations, and continued maintenance of the venues and public plazas (Rosentraub, 2014). A countywide tax on the sale of alcohol and tobacco products for funding the construction of the venues was approved. Then after the venues were built, the GEDC was to generate the revenues it needed to operate from the leases with the teams.

The GEDC is an example of an authority with a limited scope and minimal autonomy, due to its structure and finances. The structure and appointment of the GEDC's board of directors ensures the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County control the authority.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, the GEDC's limited funds and lack of an independent revenue stream severely restricts the authority's independence. When the tax on alcohol and tobacco products did not produce sufficient revenues for the GEDC to pay for the cost to construct both venues, Cuyahoga County supplied additional funds. Further, when the original leases with the teams did not produce sufficient revenues for the GEDC to fulfill its financial responsibilities, the GEDC's board was required to renegotiate with the teams.<sup>3</sup>

As noted, the GEDC was not given any role in economic development. The responsibility to leverage the venues for redevelopment was

---

<sup>2</sup>A county council, county executive, Cleveland's city council, and Cleveland's mayor each choose one commissioner, and the mayor and county executive jointly appoint the board's chair.

<sup>3</sup>Each team assumed responsibility for all maintenance expenses of \$500,000 or less, and the public sector's responsibilities were reduced to the arena's roof and heating and air conditioning systems, the arena's and ballpark's foundations, and other large-scale infrastructure elements. The teams also agreed to provide the funds for the taxes owed to the Cleveland Public Schools and for GEDC's staff.

left to the City of Cleveland and the Historic Gateway Neighborhood Corporation. Neither team's owner was asked to contribute to development activities.<sup>4</sup> These factors limited the venues' potential to act as catalysts for revitalization in the area. However, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2016 Cleveland's downtown area was home to 13,886 people, opposed to only 4,651 people in 1990. Several residential development projects are underway, and the downtown population base will soon surpass 15,000 (Sandy, 2016). In addition, the city has seen a growth in the number of higher income jobs, and Cleveland's income tax base has continued to improve as a result.

Between 2005 and 2015, Cleveland's annual income tax revenue increased from approximately \$288 million to \$347 million, an increase of more than 20%. While annual property tax revenues declined over the same period, property taxes account for a significantly smaller portion of Cleveland's general tax revenues. In 2005, the property tax accounted for 9.2% of the city's revenue base and by 2015 had decreased to 7.7%. The income taxes' increasing share of the revenue base confirms the city's focus on job attraction and retention. The decline in property tax revenues during this period does not detract from the achievements of the GDEC because, as noted, the authority was not given any role in economic development. While the GDEC had limited autonomy due to its structure and lack of an independent revenue stream, it fulfilled its intended purpose: to build and operate two new sport venues in downtown Cleveland to improve the city's amenity portfolio.

### **Indianapolis Capital Improvement Board**

The CIB was created in 1965 by the Indiana General Assembly to lead downtown economic development efforts and combat trends of suburban sprawl (Cantor, 2014). Indianapolis' plan for revitalization focused on teams, events, and cultural amenities. The CIB helped to finance, build, operate, and maintain facilities to promote conventions, entertainment, and recreational activities. The city's political leadership gave the CIB a wide scope of authority and autonomy to use sports and culture to enhance the downtown area and the local economy.

---

<sup>4</sup>Though the team owners did not initially play any role in additional development, in 2005 the Gund Brothers sold the Cavaliers to Dan Gilbert, who has been active in redeveloping downtown Cleveland.

The board's members are appointed by the mayor of Indianapolis (six members), the Marion County Board of Commissioners (two members), and the Indianapolis City-County Council (one member). A majority vote is required for a project to be authorized, giving the mayor, who appoints a majority of the board members, a high level of control. Development outcomes in Indianapolis, in terms of the number of projects initiated, can be attributed to the centralization of power. While the rapid development that has occurred over the last 50 years has been crucial to revitalizing the downtown, in his dissertation Cantor (2014) indicates the lack of public input in the process.

The CIB can issue revenue bonds, which gives the authority a level of financial independence. However, Indiana law limits the amount of indebtedness it can incur. Historically, when its debt limit has been reached, the CIB has involved additional authorities to assume issued debt for economic activities. However, the building of a new venue for the Indianapolis Colts, Lucas Oil Stadium, required additional revenue to support the amount of debt. To sustain new bonds, the legislature approved increases in local tax rates and a redirection of state tax revenues produced within the Professional Sports Development Area (PSDA). The PSDA is a designated part of the downtown area, extending only for a few blocks between the arena, convention center, and stadium. The legislation allocates state sales and income taxes, as well as food and beverage taxes generated within the PSDA to the CIB. This financing tool was politically attractive to the Indiana legislature because residents could avoid paying for the venues by spending their money elsewhere. But to further reduce the burden on the PSDA, each of the six counties adjacent to Marion County agreed to implement a tax on restaurant food and beverages to pay for the Indianapolis Colts' new stadium.

From 2011 to 2015, the CIB annually received more than \$125 million, from the various revenue streams dedicated to development opportunities (see Table 1). It uses the taxes collected within the PSDA to repay part of the bonds sold for the arena and the stadium. It can designate the balance to economic development capital projects approved by Indianapolis' council. Although the CIB does not have the authority to ensure the development of mixed-use real estate, it has effectively used a variety of sport and entertainment

venues to enhance the downtown area and the local economy.<sup>5</sup> Many consider the scope, scale, and sustained commitment to Indianapolis' revitalization plan a model for success.

**Table 1**  
*CIB Tax Collections<sup>a</sup>, 2011–2015 (in \$2015)*

Revenue source/tax rate	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Hotel (10%)	41,977,879	46,243,136	44,698,844	48,621,698	51,692,747
Food & Beverage (2%)	40,718,293	43,722,874	42,392,261	44,155,319	47,710,426
Admissions (6–10%) <sup>b</sup>	6,208,664	8,027,376	11,047,952	12,962,131	13,118,840
Auto Rental (4–6%) <sup>b</sup>	4,292,761	4,808,624	6,160,843	6,950,976	6,671,583
PSDA Allocation	26,259,285	24,598,704	25,508,258	24,433,664	25,400,848
Regional Food & Beverage (.5%)	5,637,470	5,314,763	5,255,956	5,375,289	5,167,191
Total	125,094,353	132,715,478	135,064,114	142,499,078	149,761,635

*Note.* Data from CIB Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (<http://www.capitalimprovementboard.org/main/financial/>).

<sup>a</sup>CIB Collections selected for Table 1 do not include revenues from Cigarette Tax, Specialty License Plate Fees, or Interlocal Agreement Funding (2010). <sup>b</sup>The 4% Admissions and 2% Auto Rental tax increases are effective March 1, 2013.

## **Frisco Economic Development Corporation**

As mentioned, the variety of participants in public–private partnerships for building sport venues has widened over the last 20 years to include organizations such as school districts and universities. For example, the Frisco Independent School District is a key member of the public–private partnership forged in 2013 to build The Star. The Star, located in Frisco, Texas, consists of an indoor football stadium, a training facility for the Dallas Cowboys, and a corporate center for both the Dallas Cowboys and Legends (a sport marketing firm owned, in part, by Jerry Jones). The school district benefits from their eight high schools' use of the indoor stadium; each school plays its home football and soccer games at The Star, eliminating the need to build and manage eight separate stadiums. The partnership's other stakeholders include the City of Frisco, the FEDC, the Frisco Community Development Corporation, and the Dallas Cowboys.

<sup>5</sup>Venues that have contributed to Indianapolis' downtown redevelopment strategy include a minor league ballpark, Banker's Life Fieldhouse (home of the Indiana Pacers), the Indiana Convention Center, and Lucas Oil Stadium.

The public sector paid \$115 million for the project, which is believed to have cost more than \$252 million.<sup>6</sup>

The public sector's interests in The Star are managed by one of the investing public corporations, the FEDC. The FEDC was created in 1991 with a mission to "improve the economic opportunities and quality of life for all Frisco residents" (FEDC, n.d., para. 5). The Frisco City Council appoints all seven members of the board of directors, which, similar to the Indianapolis CIB, centralizes the power structure of the FEDC. The sweeping outcomes in Frisco are not unlike those in Indianapolis; according to a 2017 study, since its establishment, the FEDC has helped facilitate "more than 350 projects that have the potential to occupy over 450 million square feet of commercial space, generate new capital investment in excess of \$8 billion, and create or retain more than 78,000 potential direct jobs in Frisco" (FEDC, n.d., para. 5). The FEDC also benefits from a significant revenue stream, which gives the corporation autonomy. The FEDC is entitled to 0.5% of the city sales tax, which amounted to nearly \$189 million in 2016 (FEDC, n.d.).

The city and the school district are repaying the bonds sold for their investment in The Star with incremental property taxes. The city can also use sales taxes to make their bond payments. Table 2 details the property and sales tax revenues over the past several years by unit of government. Note that the city has enjoyed more revenue growth as the entire project is built-out and the economy continues to improve. Its margins, however, are far less than those of the school district, which has continued to collect substantial revenue growth each year. On balance, the participation in the project led by a development authority has had reasonable returns for both units of government. This case helps validate the inclusion of a variety of organizations in public-private partnerships for sport-related development projects.

---

<sup>6</sup>The City of Frisco and the Frisco Independent School District each pledged \$30 million, and the Frisco Economic Development Corporation and the Frisco Community Development Corporation invested \$55 million between them. The Cowboys financed the remainder of the project; their total investment is expected to reach \$1.5 billion at full the build-out of the 91 acres.

**Table 2**  
*Property and Sales Tax Revenues, 2011–2016*

Tax revenues	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011
<b>City of Frisco</b>						
<b>Property</b>	59,440,263	50,391,928	43,465,631	38,344,822	36,360,872	34,568,461
TIF	5,464,343	5,100,966	4,658,780	4,431,948	4,142,786	4,250,097
Net Growth	3,583,992	1,825,331	462,029	-2,447,998	-2,350,375	-4,203,676
<b>Sales</b>	37,750,335	36,003,036	34,196,948	29,158,661	24,489,084	21,852,287
Net Growth	1,747,299	1,806,088	5,038,287	4,669,577	2,636,797	1,783,463
<b>Total Net</b>	<b>5,331,291</b>	<b>3,631,419</b>	<b>5,500,316</b>	<b>2,221,579</b>	<b>286,422</b>	<b>-2,420,213</b>
<b>Frisco Independent School District</b>						
<b>Property</b>	384,639,885	359,056,572	310,827,394	272,384,708	245,955,463	232,737,797
Net Growth	25,583,313	48,229,178	38,442,686	26,429,245	13,217,666	

*Note.* TIF = tax increment financing. From City of Frisco 2016 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (<https://www.friscotexas.gov/DocumentCenter/View/11293/Comprehensive-Annual-Financial-Report-9-30-16-PDF?bidId=>).

## **Detroit’s Downtown Development Authority**

In March 2013, Michigan’s governor announced the appointment of an emergency financial manager to oversee Detroit’s finances. Three months later, the governor also authorized the Michigan Strategic Fund to support a new arena for the Detroit Red Wings. The Michigan Strategic Fund would contribute more than a quarter billion dollars of state aid to anchor the Catalyst Development Project to stimulate real-estate development throughout downtown and midtown Detroit (Cantor, 2014). The Catalyst Development Project is coordinated by the DDA, an entity created by the City of Detroit to sustain property values in the city, whose board of directors is appointed by the mayor. Per a concession management agreement with Olympia Development (the Red Wing’s real-estate development company), the DDA assumed full managerial, operational, and maintenance responsibilities of the new arena at its opening.

Development authorities in Michigan can leverage the increment in property taxes generated from new real-estate development within its designated boundaries. This is known as tax increment financing (TIF). The key to a TIF district’s success is its ability to leverage new development to capture an increment from other taxing jurisdictions (Dye & Merriman, 2000). Authorities can use the additional property taxes to support additional real-estate

development projects, which gives them entrepreneurial motivation. The City of Detroit supports the success of the DDA by permitting investors to purchase foreclosed land and abandoned buildings at a cost of \$1 and then assigning the property taxes generated to the DDA through the TIF program.<sup>7</sup> Capital for future development must be generated by tax revenues collected from the projects in the district.

The DDA generates revenue only if it successfully attracts real-estate development to the downtown and midtown areas. If anticipated TIF revenues are not produced, the DDA does not have access to other revenue streams to cover shortfalls in bond payments.<sup>8</sup> This structure encourages the authority to be entrepreneurial in pursuit of the goals established for it—in this case, to enhance property values in the downtown. Detroit has empowered an authority to aggressively promote development projects in the interests of the city, without committing external revenues to the initiative.

Investments in downtown and midtown Detroit are laden with risk, as a result of the competition with other urban areas in the polycentric region (Goetz, 2003). Part of the initial agreement required Olympia Development to contribute \$200 million of private sector development, in addition to the venue. However, Olympia Development has since unveiled large-scale redevelopment plans, which would far exceed \$200 million in additional real estate if completed. At the arena's opening, Olympia Development announced plans for six additional residential developments, as well as \$50 million for new buildings at nearby Wayne State University and the Detroit Medical Center. Additionally, with the Detroit Pistons' relocation to the new arena, further real-estate development is likely.

## Observations and Recommendations

There are four major considerations in determining the best-suited organizational structure of an authority. First, the local government must determine the economic development goals for the public authority. Second, local officials must determine their comfort level with an authority's independence from the government

---

<sup>7</sup>The land at "no cost" provision was upheld when Detroit transferred 39 small parcels of land to the DDA and Olympia Development for the project.

<sup>8</sup>If revenues are not sufficient, the DDA would depend on additional support from the Michigan Strategic Fund.

creating it. Third, government officials must determine whether the authority will receive tax revenues. Fourth, it must be decided which units of local government (including school districts and universities) should be included in the partnership.<sup>9</sup>

Of the examined authorities created for the development of sport venues, each has successfully ensured a sport venue (or several) was built. The organizational structures of each, however, were different. The Indianapolis CIB is an example of a special district with dedicated revenue streams and substantial independence, which give the authority flexibility to advance its goals. Centralized power and the CIB's independent revenue stream were valuable tools when community leaders wanted to aggressively change downtown Indianapolis. While a concentration of power enabled the rapid approval of many projects for enhancing downtown Indianapolis, the trade-off was the little public input in projects supported by the public sector (Rosentraub, 2014).

Cleveland and Cuyahoga County's GDEC does not have access to a dedicated revenue stream, nor does it assume a role in real-estate development. In setting its organizational structure, the city and county ensured the GDEC's responsibilities were limited while insulating Cleveland and Cuyahoga County from the financial responsibilities for the arena or ballpark. While limiting local governments' financial liability may be an attractive way of structuring an authority in theory, without voter approval of the extension of the sin tax, the GDEC could not have fulfilled the terms of the leases with the Cavaliers and the Indians.

The Star in Frisco is an example of a school district's partnership with a professional team and a development authority achieving fiscal gains. The benefits to the school district are twofold. First, the need to build eight high school stadiums has been eliminated. Second, the immense growth in Frisco has continued to produce additional revenues to support every school in the district. The Cowboys' commitment to the build-out of the 20-acre project will lead to increased property and sales taxes for the city and the school district.

The key to the success of the TIF district in Detroit is its ability to leverage the Catalyst Development Project. The DDA can

---

<sup>9</sup>Other notable partnerships in an authority to build a sport venue for a university, professional teams, and commercial entertainment include the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; the University of Louisville; and North Carolina State University.

only generate additional revenue if it successfully attracts additional real-estate development downtown. This structure requires an authority to build partnerships to finance redevelopment, and it incentivizes an entrepreneurship in pursuit of its economic development goals. Detroit's authority is an example of an organization with autonomy; it can leverage any and all development in its boundaries, but with fiscal success dependent on its own ability to generate revenues.

While this paper did not test any elements of organizational theory, the review of the ways that local governments used authorities to build sport venue anchors for development provides important insights into the choices of communities. Should an authority be able to act independently? Should it have its own dedicated revenue streams? Should an authority be an actor in ensuring a sport venue anchors real-estate development? These questions should frame the responsibilities and structure of an authority.

## References

- Brooks, M. R., & Pallis, A. A. (2008). Assessing port governance models: Process and performance components. *Maritime Policy & Management*, 35, 411–432. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03088830802215060>
- Cantor, M. B. (2014). *Sports and real estate development as tools for changing patterns of regional economic activity: Managing the effects of teams and venues on local communities* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from [https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/108767/michcant\\_1.pdf?sequence=1](https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/108767/michcant_1.pdf?sequence=1)
- Cantor, M. B., & Rosentraub, M. S. (2012). A ballpark and neighborhood: Economic integration, a recession, and the altered demography of San Diego's Ballpark District after eight years. *City, Culture, and Society*, 3, 219–226. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ccs.2012.05.001>
- Chapin, T. (2002). Beyond the entrepreneurial city: Municipal capitalism in San Diego. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 24, 565–581. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9906.00144>
- City of Frisco, Texas. (n.d.). *Comprehensive annual financial report for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2016*. Retrieved from <https://www.friscotexas.gov/DocumentCenter/View/11293/Comprehensive-Annual-Financial-Report-9-30-16-PDF?bidId=>

- Dye, R. F., & Merriman, D. F. (2000). The effects of tax increment financing on economic development. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 47, 306–328. <https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1999.2149>
- Goetz, E. G. (2003). *Deconcentrating the poor in urban America*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- Erie, S. P., Kogan, V., & MacKenzie, S. A. (2011). *Paradise plundered: Fiscal crisis and governance failures in San Diego*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Feng, X., & Humphreys, B. (2012a). Assessing the economic impact of sports facilities on residential property values: A hedonic approach. *Journal of Sports Economics*, 19, 188–210.
- Feng, X., & Humphreys, B. (2012b). The impact of professional sports facilities on housing values: Evidence from census block group data. *City, Culture, and Society*, 3, 189–200.
- Feng, X., & Humphreys, B. (2018). Assessing the economic impact of sports facilities on residential property values: A spatial hedonic approach. *Journal of Sports Economics*, 19(2), 188–210. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1527002515622318>
- Frisco Economic Development Corporation. (n.d.). Why Frisco. Retrieved January 25, 2019, from <http://friscoedc.com/why-frisco>
- Insight Research Corporation. (2017). *Twenty-five year economic development overview 1991 through 2015*. Retrieved from <http://friscotexas.gov/DocumentCenter/View/13288>
- Jargowsky, P. (1996, October 1). Beyond the street corner: The hidden diversity of high-poverty neighborhoods. *Urban Geography*, 17, 579–603. <https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.17.7.579>
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83, 340–363. <https://doi.org/10.1086/226550>
- Moss, M., & O'Neill, H. (2014). *A port authority that works*. New York: NYU Wagner School, Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management.
- Patrinos, H. A., & Barrera-Osorio, F. (2009). *The role and impact of public-private partnerships in education*. Retrieved from the World Bank website: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/453461468314086643/The-role-and-impact-of-public-private-partnerships-in-education>
- The Pew Charitable Trusts. (2012). *The local squeeze: Falling revenues and growing demand for services challenge cities, counties, and school districts*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/0001/01/01/the-local-squeeze>

- Rosentraub, M. S. (2014) *Reversing urban decline: Why and how sports, entertainment, and culture turn cities into major league winners*. Boca Raton, LA: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis Group. <https://doi.org/10.1201/b17249>
- Sandy, E. (2016, February 3). The population boom in downtown Cleveland is very real and very good. But how long can it continue. *ClevelandScene*. Retrieved from <http://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/the-population-boom-in-downtown-cleveland-is-very-real-and-very-good-but-how-long-can-it-continue/Content?oid=4700955>
- Strahinich, J. (1989, November). Inside the shadow government. *Boston Magazine*, 1989, 129.
- Tu, C. C. (2005). How does a new sports stadium affect housing values? The case of FedEx Field. *Land Economics*, 81, 379–395. <https://doi.org/10.3368/le.81.3.379>
- Turner, R. S. (2002). The politics of design and development in the postmodern downtown. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 24, 533–548. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9906.00142>